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Worthy of Rejection: Copyright as Community
Property
Carla M. Roberts*
In the 1987 decision In re Marriage of Worth,1 a California Court of
Appeal held for the first time that ownership of a copyright was a community
property2 asset. Under the court's ruling, a nonauthor spouse now has rights
as a joint owner of the copyright, in addition to rights to income derived from
a work produced during a marriage.3 Because joint owners have the right under
the Copyright Ac to license copyrights independently of their co-owners, the
Worth decision creates significant uncertainty in the entertainment industry by
calling into question the validity of copyright transfers that are not jointly
executed by copyright transferors and their spouses.
Part I of this Note explains the Worth holding and its impact, and outlines
the general principles of copyright protection and community property. Part II
argues that ownership of a copyright should not be treated as community
property because such treatment provides a disincentive for authors to create
works, and thereby conflicts with the purposes of federal copyright law. Part
III argues that treating ownership of a copyright as a community property asset
is unconstitutional under the commerce clause5 because such treatment creates
an impermissible burden on interstate transfers of copyright.
* The author dedicates this Note to her mother, Dr. Carmel Mary Roberts, who always believed.
1. 195 Cal. App. 3d 768, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1987).
2. Eight states have community property systems by which spouses share ownership of all assets and
income acquired during a marriage: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas,
and Washington. 11 B. WrrKiN, Community Property, in SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW § I, at 374 (9th
ed. 1990); see infra, Subsection I.C.2. Most states, including California, allow some modification of this
formula by antenuptial agreements regarding property ownership. See W. McCLANAHAN, COMMUNrrY
PROPERTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES § 4:18 (1982 & Supp. 1989).
3. This Note distinguishes between two elements inherent in ownership of a copyright: the right to
income from a copyright, and the right to control the disposition of a copyright. Copyright law grants both
of these rights to the author. Worth establishes for the first time a community property interest in the control
element. This Note argues that it is appropriate to treat the right to income element as community property,
but that it is inappropriate, and impermissible under the commerce clause, to treat the control element as
community property. This Note uses the term "ownership of a copyright" to refer to the control element,
and the term "rights to income" to refer to the income element.
4. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988) [hereinafter the Act].
5. "The Congress shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes .... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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I. THE CALIFORNIA HOLDING: IN RE MARRIAGE OF WORTH
The Worth case required the application of two distinct bodies of law:
federal copyright law and California community property law.6 The re-
sult-treating ownership of a copyright as a community property asset---creates
enormous problems.
A. The Worth Decision
Worth involved two trivia books written, published, and copyrighted by
Frederick Worth during his marriage to Susan Worth. Upon dissolution of their
marriage in 1982, the Worths' settlement agreement stipulated that all income
derived from these books would be divided equally between them. In 1984,
Frederick sued the makers of the board game Trivial Pursuit for copyright
infringement, asserting that they had plagiarized his books in some of the
game's questions. 7 On the basis of the interlocutory divorce decree, Susan sued
for and received a court order entitling her to one-half of any proceeds Fred-
erick might receive from his copyright infringement lawsuit.8 On appeal, the
California Court of Appeal held not only that Susan was entitled to one-half
of the proceeds of the litigation (as income generated by work done during their
marriage), but also that Susan, by operation of California marital law, was a
co-owner of the copyright itself, with all the rights of a joint owner under
federal copyright law.9
B. The Impact of Worth
The ruling in Worth renders the requirements for a valid transfer of a
copyright 0 ambiguous. This is partly because the Worth court left unclear
whether transfers of community property copyrights are to be governed by
California community property law or federal copyright law. Because the two
6. This Note focuses on California because (1) Worth, the only case to address this issue as yet, was
decided in California, and (2) California is the community property state most involved in the entertainment
industry, where the ramifications of Worth will be most deeply felt. A similar ruling, however, is possible
in all community property states. See supra note 2.
7. Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1271 (1988).
8. In re Marriage of Worth, 195 Cal. App. 3d 768, 771, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 135 (1987).
9. Id. at 774, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
10. The Act defines a"transfer of copyright ownership" as "an assignment, mortgage, exclusive license,
or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights
comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not including a
nonexclusive license." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). This Note uses the term "transfer" in its generic sense to
refer to any of the above copyright conveyances, including a nonexclusive license. This Note uses the terms
"exclusive transfer" to mean a transfer included in the section 101 definition of "transfer of copyright owner-
ship", and "nonexclusive transfer" to mean a nonexclusive license specifically excluded from the section
101 definition.
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transfer standards are different, buyers cannot be certain that a transfer is valid
unless both standards are met.
Under either standard a single co-owner can license nonexclusively without
the consent of the other co-owner or owners. Under the federal copyright
standard, both co-owners must execute an exclusive license for the transfer to
be valid, whereas under the community property standard either co-owner may
execute a valid exclusive transfer. Under Worth, then, the federal copyright
standard dictates that no exclusive transfer executed by an author-past,
present, or future-is valid"1 without (1) the signature of the nonauthor
spouse," or (2) proof that the author was single at the time a work was pro-
duced.13 The community property standard dictates that past exclusive transfers
executed by the author spouse remain valid. However, the community property
standard allows a nonauthor spouse to license a work exclusively without the
author's knowledge or consent, as long as the nonauthor spouse's transfer was
executed first.
Regardless of which transfer standard is used, buyers of copyrights must
now take precautions against the dilution problem, where, prior to the execution
of an exclusive transfer, the nonauthor spouse licenses a work nonexclusively,
thus eliminating the availability of exclusive rights. If the community property
standard is used, buyers must now be concerned about the sale-out-from-under
problem, where the nonauthor spouse executes an exclusive license, thereby
leaving the author spouse without the power to transfer any rights in the work.
If the federal copyright standard is used, buyers now must contend with the
veto problem, where the nonauthor spouse is able to prevent the sale of exclu-
sive rights by refusing to sign the transfer contract.
For future deals, buyers negotiating with an author spouse now need to
investigate whether prior transfers by the nonauthor spouse exist, because such
transfers-unknown to the author spouse-will invalidate new ones. For deals
executed prior to Worth, buyers cannot be certain that exclusive transfers
remain valid, although prior nonexclusive transfers will be unaffected. In the
11. Being certain that a transferor owns the rights being purchased-and thus has the power to make
a valid transfer-has always been a problem for copyright transferees. To address this problem, copyright
purchasers typically include standard contractual covenants in which the transferor warrants ownership and
indemnifies the purchaser. See, e.g., Publishing Agreement, in SELECTIONS FOR CONTRACTS 165 (E.
Farnsworth & W. Young eds. 1988). Where covenants of this type are regularly used, Worth merely
increases the burden and the stakes for the purchaser. Transferees now have the burden of investigating the
marital history of transferors, and altering these standard contractual warranties to account for Worth. The
issue is not whether purchasers can contractually protect themselves from the effects of Worth. Rather, it
is the fact that California is causing citizens of other states to take these measures to protect themselves
from the effects of California law.
12. As used in this Note, "nonauthor spouse" refers either to a current spouse or to a former spouse
who was married to the author at the time a work was produced, and as such is a co-owner under Worth.
13. This discussion applies with equal force to married owners who buy copyrights individually (as
opposed to corporations who buy copyrights). Ownership by a married buyer would also be subject to Worth,
and therefore would involve the same kinds of practical problems. This Note focuses on the situation of
ownership by authors, because treating copyright as community property is more troubling in this context,
and the arguments against such treatment more compelling, due to the issue of creative incentives.
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shadow of Worth, those who do business with copyrights must now alter their
commercial behavior-under either the federal copyright standard or the
community property standard. 4
C. Copyright and Community Property: The Background of Worth
The Worth decision purports to find no inconsistency in its application of
federal copyright law and California community property law. Instead, Worth
provides a messy union of two bodies of law with distinct historical justifica-
tions and objectives. This union hinders the goals of copyright law without
substantially enhancing the goals of community property law.
1. Copyright
Federal copyright law is based upon the constitutional grant "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."15 Federal copyright law grants protection to authors against
infringement of their works for set periods of time. 6 The requirements for
copyright protection are that a work be original, i.e., not copied, and fixed in
a tangible medium of expression. 7 A "tangible medium of expression" is any
form from which a work can be "perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communi-
cated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device."' 8 Works eligible
14. See Perlstein, Copyright as Community Property: Questions About Worth Are More than Merely
Trivial, 9 ENT. L. REP. 3 (Apr. 1988).
Worth also raises choice of law problems, both domestically and internationally. In the international
setting, the Worth ruling raises complex problems. In international motion-picture distribution, for example,
foreign distributors often are required to present documentation showing proper chain of title-which usually
requires the signatures of all copyright owners-before they can distribute a picture, and often before an
infringement suit can be brought. See Geller, International Copyright: An Introduction, in 1 IrERNATrONAL
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE INT-1, § 6, at INT-202 to INT-203 (M. Nimmer & P. Geller eds. 1990).
If only the signatures of authors were present in the documents (which is likely for all deals that predate
Worth), accused international video pirates, for example, could move to have infringement suits dismissed
on the ground that all the required signatures of the copyright owners were not included in the chain of title
documents. This could occur for any American work, even if it did not originate in California, and even
if none of the authors had ever been married (here the issue would become proving the author was not
covered by California law, or not married). The Worth decision thus has the effect of increasing costs for
international film distribution, making recourse against pirates and other infringers more difficult to obtain,
and creating international choice of law issues for foreign and domestic courts.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For historical background on United States copyright law, see
generally R. BOWKER, COPYRIGHT: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW 1-41 (1912), and G. CURTis, TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 26-82 (1847).
16. The Act grants protection for the author's life plus fifty years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988).
17. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). Federal copyright law protects only original expression, not ideas. See
id. § 102(b). Copyright does not bar another author who independently creates a work with the same idea
as a copyrighted work from exploiting that work. Copyright infringement actions involve proving that a
protected work has been copied. In practice, this can be done by showing access to the protected work by
the alleged infringer and substantial similarity between the works. See, e.g., Ferguson v. National
Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1978).
18. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
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for copyright protection include literary works, computer programs, music,
motion pictures, paintings, sculpture, 9 and derivative works.20
The traditional theoretical justification for copyright protection is that
society grants artists the right to exclude others from copying their works for
a limited time in order to provide economic incentives to create.21 These
incentives assure a continuing supply of creations that society wants. Copyright
protection is granted primarily for the benefit of the public, not just the indiv-
idual author.' Authors are protected for an arbitrary length of time because
society has decided to encourage them to create things like books and music.
Part of the bundle of rights granted by federal copyright law is the right to
control the commercial exploitation of copyrighted works. Subject to some
specific limitations enunciated in the Act,3 the owner of a copyright has the
exclusive right to control the production and commercial exploitation of copies
or recordings of the work, production of derivative works, and public perfor-
mance and/or display of the work.' Copyright vests initially with the author
of a work;25 however, the author and any subsequent owner can sell or transfer
in part or in whole her rights in copyrighted works.26 By virtue of her exclu-
sive right to copy her own works, an author has the corollary right to refrain
from commercially exploiting her works if she so desires. 27
Federal copyright law allows for joint ownership,' both directly by authors
and indirectly by others. Joint ownership of a copyright occurs directly when
a "joint work" is created by two or more authors, 29 for example, by co-writing
a book or a piece of music. Joint ownership also occurs when ownership of the
19. Id.
20. Id. § 103. The Act defines a "derivative work" as "a work based upon one or more preexisting
works, [in any form] in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." Id. § 101.
21. Another theoretical justification for intellectual property protection is that intellectual property
should be treated just like tangible property. The creator makes it, and therefore, the creator should be able
to control what happens to it. See Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 108 (1990).
22. A. LATMAN, R. GoRMAN & J. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINEMS 14-15 (3d ed. 1989).
23. Limitations on exclusive rights include "fair use," which allows reproduction for "criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching.... scholarship, or research," 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988), and reproduction
of single copies for security purposes by libraries and archives, Id. § 108 (a)-(b).
24. Performance and display of a work are both defined by the Act, id. § 101, as are performance and
display rights. Id. § 106.
25. Id. § 201(a). This discussion applies with equal force to the authors of joint works.
26. Id. § 201(d)(1).
27. Since 1965, J.D. Salinger has chosen not to exploit his writing commercially, although he is
rumored to be an active writer. Because his rights as an author vest when his writing is rendered in a
tangible medium, i.e., as soon as it is written down, these unpublished works are protected by the Act.
Because he has the exclusive right to publish his writing under the Act, his right not to be published also
is protected under the Act. See Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 213 (1987). Under Worth, were Salinger a California resident, his wife would own half of the
copyright on each unpublished work produced during their marriage. As a co-owner, she could publish his
writings independently, or license the creation of derivative works, such as movies or television programs
based on his writings, without his consent, despite his express desire not to publish them.
28. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1988).
29. Id. Section 101 defines a joint work as "a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention
that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole."
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copyright is transferred from an existing owner to two or more parties when
they purchase the copyright together, or it can occur by operation of law.30
The traditional transfers of copyright by operation of law involve copyrights
passed in bankruptcy and those passed by intestacy upon death of the owner.31
These transfers can be of the entire copyright or of certain rights only.32
Any given work can therefore have many owners: some owning certain rights
exclusively, some owning other rights nonexclusively. Some rights can be
owned jointly, while others are owned by individuals. An owner whose rights
result from a transfer is entitled to the same protection as an owner whose
rights result from original authorship.33
Where a copyright is jointly owned, an exclusive license requires the
approval of all ownersM The exclusive rights granted to a work often are
transferred by sale as separate rights to different buyers.35 All of these subse-
quent owners can resell their rights, or transfer their rights upon death or
bankruptcy. As a result of these ordinary business transfers, the original bundle
of all exclusive rights attaching to a copyrighted work and held by its author
or authors is broken down into separate rights owned by different entities. Thus,
it is common for the ownership of the component rights of a copyright to be
divided up, either by sale or by operation of law.
Any joint owner can transfer rights in the work on a nonexclusive basis
without the consent of the other owner or owners.36 Thus, for example, a joint
author of a book could sell the nonexclusive right to adapt the book into a
musical without the consent of the other author, as long as the other author
could also nonexclusively license the book for another musical. While all of
these rights can be licensed nonexclusively in theory, certain kinds of lucrative
rights are virtually impossible to license nonexclusively in practice because of
the nature of some kinds of copyrighted works. 37 Movie producers generally
do not want to invest millions in making a movie if they face competition from
another nonexclusive licensee of the movie rights to a given novel.3 Thus,
30. id. § 201(d)(1) (1988). Copyrights may also be transferred by will. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. § 201(d).
33. Id. § 201(d)(2).
34. 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§ 6.10-.11 (1990).
35. For example, a fully exploited novel would typically result in transfers of the hardback publication
rights to one publisher, and the paperback rights to another, a production company or producer would buy
the motion picture and television rights; a merchandiser would get the rights to a derivative board game;
a composer might buy the rights to produce a derivative musical; and a playwright could acquire the rights
to a derivative stage play.
36. 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 34, § 6.11.
37. In effect, execution by one co-owner of a nonexclusive license for motion picture rights destroys
the ability of the other owner(s) to sell other nonexclusive motion picture licenses. Id. § 6.10[A].
38. Occasionally, two movies based on the same story will be made within a relatively short time
period. For example, Dangerous Liaisons (Warner Brothers 1988) and Valmont (Orion 1989) are both based
on the same novel, Les Liaisons Dangereuses, by Choderlos de Laclos, first published in 1782, and now
in the public domain. The risks for a producer in investing in a nonexclusive work include the danger that
the movie-going public will decide not to see a movie it perceives as just an imitation of something already
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the grant of a nonexclusive license by a co-owner can have a significant
negative impact on the economic return generated by a particular work.39
A goal of federal copyright law is the imposition and maintenance of a
single national standard to determine the basis for and validity of copyright
transfers. ° Copyrighted works, by their nature, are goods produced for the
purpose of commercial exchange on a national and international basis. Having
a single national standard gives all authors the same rights and protections, and
allows copyrighted works to be exchanged efficiently.
2. Community Property
The goals of copyright law include providing creative incentives and
establishing a single national standard for copyright exchange; in contrast, the
main goal of community property law is to recognize in economic terms the
contribution of nonbreadwinner spouses. While specific statutes vary from
state to state4 2 their common theme is that both partners contribute to the
success of the marital community, and therefore are equal partners, each owning
a half interest in all assets acquired during a marriage 3 Community property
systems recognize that the contribution of one spouse to raising children and
maintaining a home has the dual effect of limiting that spouse's earning
capacity while increasing the working spouse's earning capacity." To address
this common situation, community property uses the method of treating the two
spouses equally in terms of assets acquired during a marriage, regardless of who
actually earned them. Upon dissolution of a marriage, community property law
prevents the breadwinner spouse from taking out of a marriage income and
assets otherwise attributable to her efforts only.
Community property systems-including California's-characterize all
property as either separate property or community property.45 Separate proper-
ty typically is anything an individual owned prior to entering a marriage,
income received from separate property, and property received by descent,
seen. Obviously, the movie that gets released first in this instance has a commercial advantage.
39. The nonexclusive license would presumably be sold for less than an exclusive license could have
been. In all likelihood, not enough nonexclusive licenses could be sold such that their aggregate return would
equal the return of one exclusive license.
40. See 1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, supra note 34, § 1.01[A].
41. Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-spousal Transactions, 19 BAYLOR L. REV.
20, 31-41 (1967).
42. Eight states, primarily those in the Southwest with a French or Spanish tradition, treat marital
property as community property. See supra note 2.
43. See W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNrY PROPERTY § 105, at 262 (1971);
Vaughn, supra note 41, at 26.
44. Vaughn, supra note 41, at 31-41.
45. See W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 43, § I, at 2; see also 11 B. WrKIN, supra note
2, § 3, at 377.
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devise, or gift during the marriage.' Income and property acquired during a
marriage that does not fit the statutory definition of separate property is by
definition community property, belonging to both partners, regardless of who
earned the income, or who purchased or holds title to the property 7
In California, community personal property, which includes copyrights,'
may be transferred by either spouse as long as it is not given away and valuable
consideration is received in return.49 Proceeds from the transfer of community
property are also community property.50 Each spouse is required to act in good
faith with respect to the "management and control" of community property. 1
In addition, one spouse "who is operating or managing a business or an interest
in a business that is all or substantially all community personal property has
the primary management and control of the business or interest."5 "Primary
management and control" gives the managing spouse the power to make all
decisions related to that business, subject only to the good faith requirement
and to a duty to give the nonmanaging spouse prior written notice.53
46. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5107-5108 (West 1983). Rents and profits from separate property
are also separate property in California. Id. In California separate property may be conveyed by the spouse
who owns it, without the consent of the other spouse. Id. When the spouses move to different residences,
income of the separated spouses and of the children living with the respective spouses is separate property
from the date of the separation. Id. § 5118. See generally W. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 2, § 4:10.
47. See W. DE FtNiAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 43, § 66, at 143; see also, CAL. CIV. CODE § 5105
(West 1983). See generally W. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 2, § 4:13. California defines community property
as all property, real (when situated within the state) or personal (wherever situated), other than separate
property as defined in the statute. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990). Where community
property and separate property are commingled or the source is uncertain, there is a strong presumption
in California in favor of characterizing the property as community property. Estate of Luke v. Vahlidieck,
194 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1018, 240 Cal. Rptr. 84, 91 (1987); In re Marriage of Marsden, 130 Cal. App. 3d
426, 441, 181 Cal. Rptr. 910, 918 (1982). In addition to income earned by the partners during a marriage,
community property can include other forms of wealth and unearned income, such as damages from personal
injuries to one spouse and pensions. See W. MCCLANAHAN, supra note 2, § 6:27 (personal injury damages
as community property generally), §§ 6:21-:23 (pensions as community property generally); B. WrrKIN,
supra note 2, § 25 (personal injury damages as community property in California).
48. Property in California is characterized as either real or personal. Real property is immovable; it
is specifically defined as land and things related to land (fixtures, crops, etc.). Personal property is everything
that is not real property, including rights to intangible assets like goodwill and products of an author. CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 655, 657-660, 663 (West 1982).
49. CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 5125(a)-(b) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990). In contrast, community real property
may not be transferred without the consent of both spouses. Id. § 5127.
50. A change in the form of community property does not affect its character as community property.
W. BAssETrr, CALIFORNIA COMMUNrTY PROPERTY HANDBOOK § 1.01[C] (1989).
51. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5125(e) (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
52. Id. § 5125(d).
53. Id. § 5125 (d)-(e) It is unclear whether the business of producing copyrighted works for sale would
come under the primary management and control provision. One commentator has suggested that the
problems created by Worth could be alleviated by considering an author the primary manager of a business.
Perlstein, supra note 14, at 6. This invites a distinction, however, between successful authors who have been
paid regularly for their works and those who have sold little or nothing. Unless a part-time author is
considered the primary manager of a business, only established authors would be able to control their works.
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D. Copyright as Community Property: The Worth Rationale
Although scholars had speculated that copyright ownership might be treated
as community property,5 4 no court did so specifically until the Worth case.
5
Because Frederick Worth "conceived, wrote and published the trivia books
during the marriage," the court reasoned, "the conclusion is inescapable that
such literary works constituted community property."' 6 If the underlying work
is community property, then ownership of the copyright is also community
property 7
The court rejected Frederick Worth's argument for federal preemption of
California community property law under the Copyright Act5 ' by combining
the operation-of-law mechanism of federal copyright law with the substance
of California community property law. The standard for federal preemption of
state family law is enunciated in another California community property case,
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo:"9 "State family and family-property law must do
'major damage' to 'clear and substantial' federal interests before the supremacy
clause will demand that state law be overridden."'6 The Worth court avoided
federal preemption by reasoning that although rights initially vest in the author
spouse as soon as the work is rendered in a tangible medium of expression,
61
because the Act provides for transfer of copyright by "operation of law,"62
54. See. e.g., Patty, Copyright and Community Property: The Question of Preemption, 28 BULL
COPYRIGHT SOc'Y 237 (1981).
55. Nimmer, Copyright Ownership by the Marital Community: Evaluating Worth, 36 UCLA L REV.
383, 385 (1988).
56. In re Marriage of Worth, 195 Cal. App. 3d 768, 773, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135, 137.
57. Id. at 774, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 137.
58. Id. at 776, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 139. Under the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, a state
law falls when it conflicts with federal law.
59. 439 U.S. 572 (1979) (Railroad Retirement Act benefits are property of retired spouse alone)
(overruling California Supreme Court). Although Congress subsequently expressed a policy contrary to the
specific holding of Hisquierdo, see 45 U.S.C. § 231m(b)(2) (1988), that case still articulates the Supreme
Court standard for assessing community property preemption under the supremacy clause.
60. 439 U.S. at 581 (citing United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)).
61. 195 Cal. App. 3d at 777, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
62. Id. at 774, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 137. The Worth court's reasoning assumes that there is no relevant
difference between a traditional copyright transfer by operation of law, and the transfer in Worth, which
was by operation of California marital law. Interestingly, the court fails to mention Section 20 1(e) of the
Act, which reads:
When an individual author's ownership of a copyright... has not previously been transferred
voluntarily by that individual author, no action by any governmental body... purporting to seize,
expropriate, transfer, or exercise rights of ownership with respect to the copyright... shall be
given effect under this title except as provided under Title 11.
17 U.S.C. § 201(e). As Title 11 covers bankruptcy, transfers by operation of bankruptcy law do not require
an author's consent. With the exception of involuntary bankruptcy, then, Section 201(e) essentially prohibits
transfers by operation of law where the author has not consented, or consent cannot be implied. See Nimmer,
supra note 55, at 408-09. In cases where community property law was preempted by federal law, Congress
was found to have spoken with "force and clarity" to the effect that the benefit in question be considered
the separate property of the spouse upon whom it was conferred. See Wissner v. Wissner 338 U.S. 655,
658 (1950) (National Service Life Insurance policy is property of named beneficiary alone). Thus, unless
marriage is viewed as implying consent by the author to the transfer of a half interest in the copyrighted
works produced during the marriage, the only way to reach the Worth result is to hold that Section 201(e)
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California was not precluded from transferring half ownership to the nonauthor
spouse by operation of California marital law. Therefore, the Worth court found
that treating copyright ownership as community property was not inconsistent
with the Act,63 and thus there was no federal preemption of this application
of California community property law. 64
II. OWNERSHIP OF A COPYRIGHT SHOULD NOT BE TREATED
AS COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Given the policy of providing incentives to create, the specific market
characteristics of copyright, and the special nature of authorship, copyright
ownership ought not be treated as community property. The Worth court's
treatment of copyright ownership as community property hinders the goals of
copyright without substantially aiding those of community property law.
Treating copyright as community property dilutes authors" incentives to
create by denying authors full control over the decision of how best to exploit
their works. The following hypothetical65 demonstrates how Worth permits
such a result. Suppose that our author writes carefully crafted short stories,
perhaps publishing one or two a year. Her reputation grows steadily in literary
circles, but is still in its infancy, and she is virtually unknown among the
general public. After a bitter divorce, the author receives two competing offers
for exclusive movie deals on the same story, a subtle character piece about a
grandmother-granddaughter relationship that was written during the marriage
and is our author's best work to date. One offer is from a major studio for
$200,000; the production executives love the story, but want to change the
ending to make it less sad, and to add a chase sequence with the grandmother
driving a stolen car. The other offer is for $15,000, from a small production
company known for making quality, lower budget art films of the caliber of
A Room with a View. 66 Our author wants to accept the $15,000 offer because
does not speak with "force and clarity" in favor of preemption of California community property law. This
is hardly a straightforward reading of the express language of the statute. For an analysis of Section 201(e),
see Nimmer, supra note 55, at 407-09.
63. 195 Cal. App. 3d at 777, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
64. The court also rejected Frederick Worth's argument in favor of federal preemption under section
301 of the Act. Id. Section 301 provides that no state shall grant rights equivalent to those granted by section
106 of the Act. 17 U.S.C. 301 (1988). The court stated that "[rnights of ownership and division of marital
property are in no way equivalent to rights within the scope of copyright under the federal Copyright Act."
195 Cal. App. 3d at 778, 241 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
65. To date no reported cases have addressed the impact of Worth. In divorce cases the trend in recent
years has been toward privately negotiated settlement, worked out against the backdrop of existing divorce
law. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE
L.L 950 (1979); cf. Mnookin, Divorce Bargaining: The Limits on Private Ordering, 18 U. MICH. JL.
REFORM 1015 (1985). The question here is not whether cases involving Worth actually get litigated. Rather,
the questions are (1) in what manner we want legal rules to structure the bargaining positions of married
authors and their spouses, and (2) what burdens we want placed on buyers and sellers of intellectual
creations.
66. Cinecom Int'l Films 1986.
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she believes that the artistic integrity of the story will be better maintained by
the small company. In addition, the author feels an appropriate production is
essential, as this will be the first national attention her work will receive.
Although the short term monetary gain is far less, our author feels that choosing
the smaller production company is better for her long term reputation.
Because an author should be free to make this critical decision regarding
the presentation of her work, copyright ownership should not be treated as
community property. After Worth, an embittered nonauthor spouse could either
attempt independently to license the story to the big studio first if the
community property standard was applied, or force some sort of settlement if
the copyright standard was used. After a divorce, the nonauthor spouse's
interest is in maximizing the return on community property works, while the
author's interest may be in nonpecuniary gains such as reputation and career
longevity. Depending upon the transfer standard applied, Worth could force an
artist to sell her works to the highest bidder in order to obtain the nonauthor
spouse's approval for an exclusive sale, or to race to conclude a less attractive
deal in order to be first in time. By thus impeding free disposition of created
works by authors, Worth reduces incentives to create, and thereby thwarts the
purposes of federal copyright law.67
The particular market for copyrighted works magnifies the effect of Worth
on authors' incentives to create. The Worth court failed to recognize that
treating copyright ownership as community property yields adverse
consequences distinct from those arising from treating other sorts of property
as community property. Copyrighted works are bought and sold in a different
market than other types of property. A distinctive market-characteristic of
copyright is that some rights among the total bundle of ownership rights may
be, and frequently are, retained by the author even after a primary deal is
concluded. Because the markets for different kinds of copyrighted works vary,
some rights often remain unsold. This might be because the initial work does
not lend itself to every sort of derivative treatment: philosophy textbooks are
not normally adapted into musicals, for example. It may be impossible to
predict when or whether many derivative rights will be sold because the
commercial value of either the author or the work is unproven: movie rights
to early novels and stories are often sold long after initial publication, when
a subsequent work becomes a best seller, for instance, or when the author
comes into vogue.
The sale of a copyright is evidenced only by the contract of sale.68 Thus,
years later, when retained rights are sold, Worth requires buyers to determine
if the author was married at the time the work was produced, and to locate the
67. One could argue that Worth does not prevent an author from controlling her work, but simply makes
it more expensive for the author spouse to gain control of her work. Even if an author could always achieve
control under Worth (which is not at all clear), the increased cost still yields a disincentive to create.
68. The U.S. Copyright office does not record transfers of copyrights.
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nonauthor spouse either to get approval or to find out if an independent non-
exclusive license exists. Because an author cannot always know if her spouse
or former spouse has executed a prior license, giving nonauthor spouses control
over a copyright effectively clouds the title to the work. With transfers of land,
on the other hand, title is recorded at a municipal office, so a buyer can check
if the seller has the power to sell the land; in the case of the sale of other
tangible assets, the sold object is physically handed over to the buyer, so the
asset will be gone if one spouse sells it. Thus, the effect of treating copyright
ownership as community property differs from the effect of such treatment for
other forms of property, because of the particular retained-rights aspect of
copyright ownership and the lack of systemized recording of transfers.
Treating copyright ownership as community property is also different than
treating tangible property as community property because the way one copy-
righted work is exploited can affect the future marketability of other works
created by the author spouse. If a nonauthor spouse markets a community
property work in a manner contrary to the marketing posture taken by the
author spouse, the nonauthor spouse's activities can affect the success of the
author spouse's marketing efforts. For example, if a painter is building a
reputation as a serious artist, and the painter's spouse markets coffee mugs and
t-shirts emblazoned with one of the painter's community property works, the
painter may have difficulty selling serious work in the future. When property
is divided upon divorce, post-separation works are considered separate
property.69 Thus, if the painter's spouse's sale of coffee mugs increases the
profitability of the painter's community property works to the detriment of the
painter's other works, the painter's spouse effectively gains access to the
painter's separate property." In addition, the sale of a nonexclusive license
by the nonauthor spouse can detrimentally affect the price the author can obtain
for the remaining rights.
These adverse consequences do not occur when other forms of property
are treated as community property. Other assets owned by a married couple are
generally sold once, with all rights as part of the package. The sale of a
particular piece of community property does not typically affect the ability to
sell other like pieces, nor does it affect the ability of the spouse to sell like
separate property. The distinctive features of the market for copyrighted works
make authorial control a crucial component of the incentives to create.71
69. CAL. CIV. CODE § 5118 (West 1983).
70. This reasoning echoes the California graduate degree cases. These cases hold that, because
post-dissolution earnings are defined by statute as separate property, id., the value of the education that made
those earnings possible could not be considered a community asset. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Aufmuth,
89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 460-61, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668, 677-78 (1979).
71. If the market for copyrighted works functioned differently Worth would not have the same impact
on authors' incentives. In the case of works-for-hire, for example, Worth has no effect on incentives to
create. There, the copyright is owned by the person or company that hired the author. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101,
201(b) (1988). Thus, the author enters the arrangement knowing that the copyright owner can dispose of
the work as she sees fit. In the work-for-hire situation, the specific contract fee is all the author will ever
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In addition to the policy of providing incentives to create, the nature of
copyrighted works, as opposed to other forms of property, suggests that such
works ought not be treated as community property. Simply put, there is some-
thing special about authorship that demands we give creators ultimate control
over the marketing and disposition of their works (until the author sells the
copyright, at which time, of course, she renounces such control). This argument
is in the spirit of the moral rights theory of copyright, not traditionally used to
justify copyright protection in the United States,7" but recognized elsewhere. 3
As discussed previously, federal copyright protection is not premised on the
natural right of an author to control her creation, but upon utilitarian grounds.
However, by encouraging the creation of copyrighted works, federal copyright
law implicitly recognizes the intrinsic worth-not just the social value-of what
authors do. While federal copyright law may not give authors control over the
disposition of their works simply because they created them, an argument in
favor of extending authors this control on moral grounds is consistent with the
utilitarian policies and goals of copyright law.74
III. WORTH FAILS UNDER COMMERCE CLAUSE ANALYSIS
Apart from the question of whether copyright should be community property
is that of whether treating copyright as community property passes
constitutional muster.75 Based on Supreme Court commerce clause jurispru-
receive for the work. Worth would affect the incentives of individuals who hire authors to create works,
as their copyright ownership would be community property. Thus, to the extent that individuals invest in
the creation of copyrighted works by means of works-for-hire, Worth would have an effect on that
investment. In situations where works-for-hire are owned by publicly held companies, Worth would have
no effect whatsoever. Thus, one effect of Worth may be to encourage corporate-owned work-for-hire at the
expense of individual creation or work-for-hire ownership.
72. "Moral rights" are personal rights of the author, distinct from economic rights, such as the author's
right of paternity (the right to claim authorship of a work) and the right of integrity (the right to prevent
the destruction or defacement of a work). In 1990 Congress passed an amendment to the Act recognizing
moral rights for visual artists. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5127
(1990).
73. France, for example, recognizes "moral rights." See Plaisant, France, in 1 INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 14, FRA-l, § 7, at FRA-12.
74. Richard Epstein argues that, while differences remain, utilitarianism can justify the assumptions
of natural rights theories. Epstein, The Utilitarian Foundations of Natural Law, 12 HARv. .L. & PUB. POL'Y
713 (1989).
75. There are other ways for the practical problems of Worth to be alleviated. The California courts
could clarify which transfer standard applies. The California courts could also, as one commentator has
suggested, presume consent between the spouses granting sole authority to the author spouse over ownership
decisions. Nimmer, supra note 55, at 414. Although this method would solve the Worth problem if a judge
decided to use it, another judge could just as easily reject it.
State statutory solutions also have been suggested. See id. at 413. Congress could amend the ownership
language of the Act to indicate that ownership of a copyright is the separate property of the author. Such
a statute would supersede the Worth holding in California, and prevent other community property states
from following California's lead.
Individual parties can prevent problems in future deals with careful contract drafting. See Perlstein,
supra note 14, at 6. Premarital agreements-or, for pre-existing contracts, documents either from transferors
affirming their unmarried status at all relevant times, or from spouses and former spouses agreeing to the
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dence, the Worth court's application of California community property law
impermissibly interferes with interstate transfers of copyright. Supreme Court
cases have held state laws to be preempted under the commerce clause where
the state regulations result in impermissible interference in interstate matters,
even though (1) the state may have a genuine interest in the area it seeks to
regulate, and (2) federal regulation in the area of the state law does not specifi-
cally preempt the state regulation.
The Supreme Court currently uses two different approaches when reviewing
commerce clause challenges to state regulations. As the Court explained in one
of its most recent commerce clause cases, Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.
New York State Liquor Authority:76
When a state statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate
commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over
out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down the statute without
further inquiry. When, however, a statute has only indirect effects on
interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly, we have examined
whether the State's interest is legitimate and whether the burden on
interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits .... In either
situation the critical consideration is the overall effect of the statute on
both local and interstate activity.'
The Court goes on to apply the first approach, usually called the per se test."8
A. Brown-Forman and the Per Se Test
In Brown-Forman, the Supreme Court declared a New York price regulation
statute unconstitutional on its face under the commerce clause. The New York
statute at issue had required all liquor producers selling to wholesalers in New
York to affirm that their New York prices would be as low as their prices in
other states for the following month. The Court reasoned that because the
statute prevented a producer from reducing its prices in another state after New
York State's prices were set for the month, New York was in effect reaching
out to regulate business within other states: "New York has 'project[ed] its
legislation' into other States, and directly regulated commerce therein .... ."79
The Court held the statute unconstitutional on its face even though it was
prior transfer-would resolve the problems, where these documents could be obtained. While it is difficult
to estimate how much Worth will cost individuals in general, it is clear Worth increases costs for everyone
concerned. Worth may produce a net gain for nonauthor spouses, but costs as a whole will be likely to
increase because of the addition of something else to litigate.
76. 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
77. Id. at 579 (citations omitted). The Court notes: "We have also recognized that there is no clear
line separating the category of state regulation that is virtually per se invalid under the Commerce Clause,
and the category subject to the Pike v. Bruce Church balancing approach." Id; see infra Section llI.B.
78. 476 U.S. at 579-80.
79. Id. at 584 (citation omitted).
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directed only at internal New York pricing because "the 'practical effect' of
the law [was] to control liquor prices in other States." 0 This regulatory effect
rendered the statute unconstitutional despite New York's legitimate interest in
securing low prices for New York consumers.
The California community property statute at issue in Worth has essentially
the same flaws that the Brown-Forman Court found fatal for the New York
statute. By declaring a community property interest in copyright ownership,
California forces citizens of other states, doing business with other
non-California residents, to alter their method of doing business at substantial
cost in order to protect themselves from the regulatory effect of the statute as
interpreted in Worth. The community property statute also burdens non-
California citizens who have co-authored works with California residents and
wish to do business involving their works with other non-California residents.
Moreover, buyers dealing with Californians may have to pay more to secure
the nonauthor spouse's approval; therefore, California essentially makes buyers
pay a premium to California nonauthor spouses. When one state treats copyright
ownership as community property, those whose business includes the transfer
of copyrights must take precautions in drafting their contracts to try to avoid
the potential problems created by that treatment.81 For example, if both spous-
es jointly sign an exclusive licensing agreement, the transfer would be valid
regardless of whether the community property or the copyright transfer standard
applied. Thus, those who engage in businesses involving copyrights, whether
within California or without, now bear the burden of determining the domicile
of the apparent copyright owner, or else bear the substantial cost of procuring
nonauthor spouses' approval for every transfer."2
As was true in Brown-Forman, the fact that the statute in Worth is aimed
explicitly only at California domiciliaries should not protect the statute from
a commerce clause challenge. Although Worth has a less direct effect on
interstate commerce than the price affirmation statute in Brown-Forman, the
"practical effect" of treating copyright ownership as community property is to
"project"8 3 California property law into other states by reaching out to regulate
copyright transfers between citizens of other states. Worth forces not only
80. Id. at 583 (citation omitted).
81. Existing exclusive deals would be valid if the community property standard is applied because either
spouse could make an exclusive transfer. Existing exclusive deals may be invalid if the copyright standard
is applied because approval of both spouses is required.
82. One's domicile can be changed by moving to a new state with the intent to reside and remain there
indefinitely. See Smith v. Smith, 45 Cal. 2d 235, 239, 288 P.2d 497, 499 (1955); Johnson v. Johnson, 245
Cal. App. 2d 40,44,53 Cal. Rptr. 567,570 (1966); Estate of Brace, 180 Cal. App. 2d 797,802,4 Cal. Rptr.
683, 687 (1960). Any person who seeks to purchase copyrights, whether in California or not, must verify
that the party from whom she is purchasing the rights is not a California domiciliary. If the transferor is
a California domiciliary, the purchaser must, under the community property standard, verify that a nonauthor
spouse has not executed a prior conflicting license, or, under the copyright standard, procure the nonauthor
spouse's approval for the transfer.
83. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1986)
(citation omitted).
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Californians, but also-and more importantly for commerce clause purpos-
es-non-Californians to investigate the author's domicile, prior licenses by the
nonauthor spouse, and the related contract revision, all of which involve addi-
tional expense.8" Such treatment is therefore invalid under the commerce
clause per se test used in Brown-Forman.
In addition, the Court has characterized Brown-Forman as an example of
a case where it invalidated a statute that "adversely affect[ed] interstate
commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent regulation. '85 Statutes cause
impermissibly inconsistent regulation under the commerce clause where their
subjects "are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or
plan of regulation."86 The regulation of copyright ownership, promulgated
under a Constitutional grant, and governed by a federal statute which specifi-
cally calls for preemption of inconsistent state laws,' is an area that "admit[s]
only of one uniform system." Therefore, treating copyright as community
property is impermissible under the Brown-Forman commerce clause test.
Finally, it makes no difference that California's community property statute has
traditionally been characterized as marital law. Because treating copyright
ownership as community property effectively regulates commercial behavior
by favoring in-state nonauthor spouses over out-of-state interests, such treatment
fails the per se test. The triggering condition for the statute is the state of
marriage, but the subject matter-marital property-is entirely economic.
B. Pike and the Balancing Test
The second approach taken by the Supreme Court when reviewing com-
merce clause challenges to state regulations is the balancing test, best formulat-
ed in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 8 The balancing test requires that burdens
placed on interstate commerce be weighed against the benefits accruing to in-
state parties. As the Court explained in Pike:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only inci-
dental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.... [The
extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the
84. Under Worth, California domiciliaries would face the same burdens as non-Californians, but the
fact that some in-state parties are burdened in the same way as out-of-state parties has been held irrelevant
in assessing a statute's validity under the commerce clause. See Dean Milk v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354,
n.4. (1951); see infra note 93 and accompanying text. As long as California law reaches out to interstate
transactions involving non-California parties, the law must be permissible under the commerce clause.
85. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987) (citation omitted).
86. Id. at 88-89 (citing Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1852)).
87. 17 U.S.C. 301 (1988). Even if the Worth court is correct, and there is no federal preemption under
section 301, see supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text, section 301 still evidences Congressional
recognition of the need for a consistent body of copyright regulation nationwide.
88. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be
promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.89
Under Pike a state statute that survives the per se test will still be struck
down if the indirect burdens imposed on interstate commerce by the statute
outweigh the legitimate state interest. The balancing test examines the actual
impact of the challenged law, and whether the same interest could be
adequately promoted in another, less burdensome way.
The Arizona statute at issue in Pike required that all cantaloupes grown in
Arizona be packed in Arizona in specific standard containers which identified
the goods as being from Arizona before their shipment out of state. Bruce
Church, Inc. grew high quality cantaloupes in Arizona which it shipped in bulk
across the nearby state line into California for packing at its existing plant.
Arizona had an interest in promoting Arizona produce by guaranteeing that
Bruce Church's high quality cantaloupes would be accurately identified as
Arizona produce. This regulation, were it enforced, would have forced Bruce
Church to build a new packing facility inside Arizona so that the cantaloupes
could be labeled before they were shipped. By balancing these interests the
Court concluded that "[the commerce clause] cannot permit a State to require
a person to go into a local packing business solely for the sake of enhancing
the reputation of other producers within its borders."90 Arizona, the Court
held, could not force Bruce Church to change its national business methods at
substantial expense for the sake of the state's minimal interest.
Like the commercially grown produce in Pike, copyrighted works are
produced for national and international commercial exchange. In Pike, Arizona
was limiting the choices available to a cantaloupe producer in deciding how
best to exploit its crop through interstate commerce. Selecting the best licensee
for the movie production of a novel is as much a commercial business decision
as is selecting the best site for a cantaloupe packing plant. "Best" can mean
the most cost-effective, the most effective marketing, or most able to preserve
the artistic integrity of a work. By preventing copyright authors from making
independent business decisions about what is best for their works, Worth treats
these authors as Arizona treated the cantaloupe growers in Pike. More directly,
to the extent that out-of-state interests must pay more to Californians for
California works (to get the approval of nonauthor spouses), California commu-
nity property law is substantively identical to the Arizona cantaloupe law struck
down in Pike. The commerce clause protects against interference with interstate
commerce in goods; it does not distinguish between intangible goods, such as
ideas, and tangible goods, such as cantaloupes. Under Pike, the Worth inter-
89. Id. at 142 (citation omitted).
90. Id. at 146.
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pretation of California community property law violates the commerce
clause. 9'
The situation created by the Worth decision also parallels that at issue in
an earlier Supreme Court case that also balanced state interests against interstate
burdens, Dean Milk Co. v. Madison.92 In Dean Milk, the city of Madison,
Wisconsin passed a health regulation forbidding the sale of milk in the city
unless it was pasteurized within five miles of the center of the city at an
approved pasteurizing plant. Although the ordinance at issue in Dean Milk
imposed the same burdens on both in-state and out-of-state milk producers, the
court noted explicitly that "[i]t is immaterial that Wisconsin milk from outside
the Madison area is subjected to the same proscription as that moving in
interstate commerce." 93 Because the "practical effect" of the ordinance was
to exclude wholesome milk from Illinois and prevent competition with milk
producers outside Madison, the Supreme Court held that this ordinance plainly
discriminated against interstate commerce. 4
California's treatment of copyright ownership as community property is
analogous in that it burdens in-state and out-of-state buyers of copyright
equally. Just as it was immaterial in Dean Milk that some in-state producers
were burdened along with the out-of-state producers, so is it immaterial that
California burdens in-state buyers of copyrighted works along with out-of-state
buyers. California gives benefits to one class of Californians, nonauthor
spouses, at the expense of those who do business in the purchase and sale of
copyrights. Hence, following the reasoning of Dean Milk, Worth's treatment
of copyright ownership as community property violates the commerce clause.
91. See also Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (plurality opinion), where the Court found
an Illinois statute regulating tender offers preempted by the Williams Act and unconstitutional under the
commerce clause. One effect of the statute at issue in MITE was that an out-of-state corporation making
a tender offer for another out-of-state corporation which had ten percent of its capital within Illinois had
to comply with an Illinois procedural requirement when purchasing stock of the target owned by out-of-state
residents. The Court found that the act "applies to corporations that are not incorporated in Illinois and have
their principal place of business in other States. Illinois has no interest in regulating the internal affairs of
foreign corporations." Id. at 645-46. In MITE, the burden Illinois imposed on interstate commerce was a
set of tender offer regulations that had the "practical effect" of regulating out-of-state conduct. Id. at 643
(quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,775 (1945)). The Court held that the statute failed
the commerce clause balancing test because it imposed burdens on interstate commerce that were excessive
when compared to the interest Illinois sought to protect.
In MITE, the effect of the statute was to regulate the acquisition of a non-llinois company by another
non-illinois company. By treating copyright ownership as community property, California forces non-Calif-
ornians doing business with other non-Californians to alter their business behavior at substantial economic
cost. Thus, pursuant to the Worth decision, California now regulates the commercial behavior of out-of-state
parties in the same manner as Illinois did with its unconstitutional tender offer statute. While the parts of
the opinion discussing preemption based on the Williams Act and per se invalidity under the commerce
clause were signed by only three and four justices, respectively, and thus do not bind the Court to its
reasoning, see UTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 81 (1987) (narrowing the application
of MITE to allow states to regulate tender offers for corporations incorporated within their boundaries), the
part finding the statute unconstitutional under the commerce clause balancing test was signed by five justices.
92. 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
93. Id. at 354, n.4. (citation omitted).
94. Id. at 354.
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California's interest is in economically protecting those spouses who
generally are not primary breadwinners. Treating copyright ownership as com-
munity property by awarding ownership rights to nonauthor spouses is a
burdensome way to serve California's interest in protecting nonbreadwinner
spouses. Treating copyright ownership as community property does not grant
nonauthor spouses a greater share of the income generated by the copyright.
The only benefit such treatment gives nonauthor spouses is leverage in situa-
tions where the author spouse selects a less lucrative way to exploit a communi-
ty property copyright. 95 Worth burdens all transfers in order to protect non-
author spouses in those few situations where the author spouse seeks to sup-
press income. Thus, the only benefit provided is small, confined to a subset of
nonauthor spouses.
When applying the balancing test to California's treatment of copyright
ownership as community property, an essential inquiry is whether California
can promote its legitimate interest "as well" by some other means that has "a
lesser impact" on interstate commerce. 96 Prior to Worth, California served its
family law interest by declaring the income generated by copyright-protected
works produced during a marriage to be community property. Denying non-
author spouses ownership rights under the copyright act would not affect the
rights of these spouse to this income. If ownership of a copyright is not com-
munity property in terms of disposition and control, but rights to income are,
nonauthor spouses do not lose this income stream in the event of divorce.
Because the work is considered to be community property, income earned by
the work after the dissolution of the marriage would be treated as community
property (in the same way as rents from a community property building), not
as separate property (such as income of one spouse after separation). 97
Nonauthor spouses were well-protected economically prior to Worth, and the
purposes of the community property system were served without giving
nonauthor spouses co-owner status.
Because California's legitimate interest in regulating marital economic
relationships within California can be adequately promoted without granting
ownership rights to nonauthor spouses, this interest weighs against finding the
statute, as interpreted by the Worth court, to be consistent with the commerce
clause. Moreover, the benefit provided to nonauthor spouses by treating copy-
right ownership as community property is small, while the burdens placed on
interstate commerce are significant. California's interest in granting co-owner
status to nonauthor spouses is therefore not sufficient to justify the excessive
95. In the hypothetical used in Section II, supra, Worth gives the nonauthor spouse the power to push
for a more lucrative deal where the author wants to license her work for a small budget art film. Giving
the author spouse sole ownership of the copyright permits that spouse purposefully to suppress the
commercial exploitation of community property works in the divorce context, simply to spite the nonauthor
spouse, while providing no recourse for the nonauthor spouse.
96. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
97. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5107-5108, 5110, 5118 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990).
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burdens placed on interstate commerce in copyrights, and as such is unconstitu-
tional under the commerce clause balancing test as well as the per se test.
With this said, it must be acknowledged that the application of the com-
merce clause advocated here is not a foregone conclusion. To hold that under
the commerce clause copyright ownership may not be treated as community
property would break new ground.98 If, as one scholar has argued,99 and one
Supreme Court justice has agreed,"tu the Supreme Court's commerce clause
jurisprudence is really only concerned with protectionist state measures, 0 1
and the balancing test is only a veil for this purpose, treating copyright owner-
ship as community property might withstand a commerce clause challenge. If,
on the other hand, the Court were to apply the standards outlined in Brown-
Forman, Pike, and Dean Milk, copyright as community property should fall.
CONCLUSION
Treating copyright ownership as community property is contrary to the basic
policy of federal copyright law, which is to provide authors with incentives to
create. Nonauthor spouses are protected adequately by granting a community
property interest in the income derived from copyrights, as opposed to owner-
ship rights. Furthermore, the transfer of ownership rights in copyrights to
nonauthor spouses by operation of state community property law places an
unacceptably large burden on interstate commerce and thus fails under
commerce clause analysis.
Returning to the pre-Worth status quo by treating the income derived from
the copyright as community property, but treating control of the copyright as
the author's alone would (1) restore authors' incentives to create; (2) alleviate
the concerns of out-of-state transferees; (3) eliminate the transfer standard
dilemma by mooting the community property transfer standard; (4) adequately
protect nonauthor spouses by granting them half of the income generated by
copyrighted works attributable to the community; and (5) create no
impermissible burdens on interstate commerce.
98. Traditionally, commerce clause cases have involved economic regulations, not the economic effects
of the application of a family law statute.
99. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 84 MIcH. L. REV. 1091 (1986).
100. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69,95 (1987) (Scalia, J. concurring); cf. Tyler
Pipe Indus. v. Department of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 259-260 (1987) (Scalia, J. concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ('IThe practical results we have educed from the so-called 'negative' Commerce Clause
form not a rock but a 'quagmire'. ... [Olur applications of the doctrine have, not to put too fine a point
on the matter, made no sense.") (citation omitted).
101. Regan, supra note 99, defines a statute as protectionist if (1) its purpose is to "improv[e] the
competitive position" of in-state competitors over out-of-state competitors, and (2) it is "analogous in form
to the traditional instruments of protectionism-the tariff, the quota, or the outright embargo . . ." Id. at
1094-95. Obviously, California community property law does not readily fit this definition.
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